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Over the past 20 years, the Japanese employment relationship
has been emerging as the global standard for multinational
enterprises. Its introduction has created conflicts with local
standards, however: in the case of Argentina, with the
egalitarian culture of the unions. The essence of the Japanese
employment relationship lies i) in the combination of
different elements that go to make up flexible working
(multi-skilling, kaizen, etc.) with competitive wages based
on individual assessments, and ii) in long-term employment
agreements, which have been undermined in Argentina by
neoliberal reforms. How might the unions encourage
cooperative internal flexibility, whilst ensuring job stability?
The present essay addresses this issue, drawing on interviews
with Ford, GM, Toyota and the Sindicato de Mecánicos y
Afines del Transporte Automotor (SMATA), the car workers’
union.
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I
Introduction
The Japanese economy emerged strengthened from the
two oil crises thanks to the rapid introduction of
microelectronic technology into products and
production processes during the second half of the
1970s and the 1980s. The speed of this recovery drew
the attention of the international business and academic
communities to the organization of production and the
characteristics of the “employment relationship”1 in
Japan, as they sought for alternatives to the Taylorist-
Fordist model that had gone into crisis in the early
1970s.
The superior capacity of this system to generate
productivity increases and quality improvements in a
context of continuous technological innovation and
competition on a world scale meant that it spread
internationally in the 1980s and 1990s. It advanced
particularly quickly in the latter decade, alongside
market opening and deregulation.
In Argentina, the populist development paradigm
established after the Second World War began to show
signs of institutional exhaustion in the first half of the
1970s, manifested chiefly by a relative decline in
economic activity and high inflation rates. In 1976 the
first neoliberal reform was implemented; this led to an
unprecedented external debt crisis and culminated in
failure, and it is mainly because of this that the 1980s
have come to be known as the “lost decade”.
Subsequently, 1991 saw the launch of what would
become a far-reaching second neoliberal reform,
including the introduction of a fixed exchange rate
against the dollar, rapid trade and financial
liberalization, large-scale privatization of public-sector
companies and a labour reform that, among other things,
cut redundancy payments and brought in short-term
employment contracts. Hyperinflation was tamed and
the economy grew intermittently, but unemployment
reached levels unprecedented in the country’s history.
While all this was going on, multinational
automotive companies had been applying, both in their
home countries and in subsidiaries around the world,
elements of the production organization and
employment relationship originating in Japan. In the
1990s they did the same in Argentina, although Ford
had already made a first effort in this direction in the
early 1980s, as will be seen shortly.
How far have automotive multinationals operating
in Argentina gone in introducing a Japanese-style
employment relationship? What obstacles have they
encountered in the process? What ought to be done to
overcome these? The purpose of this essay is to answer
these questions. To do this, of course, we need to
consider employment relationships in Argentina
generally. The efforts we refer to here have necessarily
come up against the history and current situation of
national and sectoral labour relations, involving
different institutions that have influenced the timing
and nature of the results. These institutions include the
unions, labour laws and labour markets, both within
and outside the companies concerned. In Argentina, the
behaviour of unions is a crucial factor.
In section II of this paper, we briefly review the
stylized facts of the Japanese employment relationship,
drawing directly on the most important studies
compiled by Japanese researchers and laying particular
emphasis on their ambivalent aspects, since these are
of special importance for the strategy that ought to be
adopted by Argentine unions. We also touch on the
impact that neoliberal economic policy has had on the
image of the Japanese employment relationship among
workers.
In section III, we look at the current situation of
the Argentine subsidiaries of three automotive
multinationals (General Motors, Ford and Toyota) in
order to evaluate the nature and institutional dynamic
of the conflicts between companies and unions to which
efforts to “Japanize” the employment relationship are
giving rise.
Preliminary versions of this work were presented at the Annual
Conference of the Japanese Association of Latin American Studies
(4 June 2000, Kyoto University of Foreign Studies, Kyoto) and at
the Annual Conference of the Japanese Association for Evolutionary
Economics (31 March 2001, Kyushu Industrial University,
Fukuoka). We are grateful for the comments of those who took
part in the two events, particularly professor Takeshi Shinoda,
former Dean of the Faculty of Industrial Sociology at Ritsumeikan
University, Kyoto, and of an anonymous CEPAL Review referee.
1
 By “employment relationship” is meant specifically the way
labour utilization is organized and wages set; this intermediate-
level concept allows the macro wage labour relationship to be
analysed at the company level (Coriat, 1991).
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In section IV, we discuss the strategy needed to
prevent the combination of a “Japanized”
employment relationship2 and a neoliberal economic
policy becoming the standard form of capital
accumulation. As well as seeking a “third way” that
rejects neoliberalism (and populism) and can
generate stable growth and long-term employment,
we suggest that a necessary objective is internal
flexibility based on cooperative relationships among
workers.
II
What “Japanization” means for unions
in the neoliberal era
In its original form, the employment relationship
prevailing among male production workers in large
Japanese companies involves a tacit agreement between
companies and workers: the companies undertake to
provide long-term employment,3 the workers to do their
best to meet company objectives. In this context,
workers accept flexible job assignments and working
hours, ongoing training to meet the changing needs of
the company and a wage system that, while taking
account of age and years of service, encourages
competition among workers through individual
assessments that are reflected in pay differences.
Although these differences were relatively small during
the period of rapid economic growth (1955-1973), they
gradually increased over the 1990s. At the same time,
greater and greater importance was attached to actual
skills, to the detriment of potential ones, in setting
wages; in other words, there was a widening of wage
differences based on evaluations of work done.4
Where production workers are concerned, all these
elements clearly contrast with the “employment
bureaucracy”5 of the Taylorist-Fordist tradition, which
prevails in countries whose culture is Western in a broad
sense, including the Latin American ones. Among them,
we should particularly like to emphasize individual
assessment –a basic tool developed to encourage
competition among workers– and its impact on wages.6
2
 See Sano, 1998, chapter 5 for an initial approach to the
“Japanization” of the employment relationship in Argentina. Sano
(1999) analyses the increasing flexibility of the employment
relationship that has been a feature of Latin America over recent
years. Di Martino (1999a) carries out a historical analysis of the
employment relationship in the case of engineering staff at two
multinationals producing equipment for telephone exchanges in
Argentina.
3
 This is not the same as so-called lifetime employment, which
wrongly tends to be considered one of the characteristics of the
Japanese employment relationship. In fact, there are Japanese
companies that have laid workers off after suffering losses for two
years running, although they usually try to maintain employment
through various institutional mechanisms before resorting to this
(Koike, 1991, pp. 101-103). As different cases of fairly large-scale
redundancies in big enterprises have shown, traditional long-term
employment practices have begun to weaken owing to the long
recession that has afflicted the Japanese economy over the last 10
years. For the time being, however, no definitive breakdown in
this arrangement is necessarily in prospect.
4
 The most representative studies of the employment relationship in
large Japanese firms, such as those of Kumazawa (1997), Koike (1997),
Ishida (1990), Nomura (1993) and others, while they differ in their
evaluation criteria and the aspects they highlight, are not in substantial
disagreement over the stylized facts we have been setting forth. Di
Martino (1996 and 1999b) examines the employment relationship in
the case of engineers in large Japanese electronics firms.
5
 This concept, introduced by Jacoby (1985), refers to the way
arbitrary treatment of workers by employers is done away with by
institutionalizing practices such as stable employment, internal
promotion and the wage scale, resulting in a reduction of
competition among workers.
6
 The following example of wage composition taken from a large
automotive company is suggestive. In 1991, a worker’s basic wage
was composed of the following four parts: fixed wage (about 30%),
seniority wage (about 25%), qualification wage (just under 40%)
and performance wage (about 7%). Of these, the third depends on
each worker’s qualification level, which is determined by assessing
his or her skills (breadth and depth of work experience). The fixed
wage, on the other hand, is determined by qualifications, ongoing
assessment of skills and length of service. The performance wage
is determined on the basis of the annual skills assessment within a
given qualification level. Thus, if the purely egalitarian part (the
seniority wage) is deducted, about 75% of a worker’s basic wage
in that company is influenced in some way by competitive factors
(Koike, 1997, pp. 102-108). Similar competitive relationships have
been observed among white-collar workers, not only in Japan but
in Western countries as well, although the same thing does not
necessarily happen among Western blue-collar workers (Ishida,
1990; Koike, 1997; Kumazawa, 1997).
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Large Japanese companies like to encourage such
competition because they claim that it drives
productivity and product quality improvements. Union
organizations in Argentina, meanwhile, are rooted in
the tradition of employment bureaucracy. They prefer
an egalitarian culture, regarding this indeed as their
reason for existing, and seek as far as possible to retain
a close link between the position worked in and the
wage paid (equal pay for equal work). They thus see
efforts to promote competition among individual
workers as a threat to their own existence.
Indeed, “Japanization” of the employment
relationship –the example of Japan itself seems to suggest
this– would result in a world where unions were unable to
offer their members ways of improving their working
conditions, i.e., in a world without unions. At the same
time, though, workers have a “guarantee” of long-term
employment and, with the system of flexible job allocation
(internal flexibility),7 they quickly acquire the skills to
perform a variety of tasks; these things enrich their working
lives and can be regarded as positive in themselves. As we
shall see later, though, this Japanese world of work, whose
two facets derive from the undertaking we described
earlier, was introduced into Argentina almost
contemporaneously with neoliberal reforms. For this
reason, “Japanization” advanced alongside external
employment flexibilization and massive unemployment,
thus leaving a negative impression.8
In these circumstances, the unions need to make
the effort, on the one hand, to get past Taylorist-Fordist
thinking and accept internal flexibility in the use of
labour and, on the other, to oppose neoliberalism, which
entails increased external flexibility, and seek an
alternative form of labour use that ensures efficiency,
participation, solidarity and distributive justice. We shall
return to this point in more detail in the last section,
but first, in the section that follows, we shall use three
case studies of multinational automotive companies to
look at the actual forms taken on by the micropolitical
economy of “Japanization”.
III
The micropolitical economy of “Japanization”:
three multinational automotive companies9
1. The first attempt: Ford
Ford pioneered certain aspects of Japanese staff
management methods in Argentina. The company’s first
attempt, in 1980, extended principally to the creation
of quality control circles (QCCs) so that workers would
be involved in producing incremental technological
innovations (i.e., adaptation or improvement), and it
was a direct response to the threat posed to the company
at that time by the deregulation of car imports resulting
from neoliberal economic policy and by the competitive
advantages secured by the Japanese car industry.
The economic policy of the military dictatorship
established in Argentina in 1976 was an early (and
abortive) attempt to open up the economy to the world
market. General Motors controlled between 10% and
15% of the market at that time, and in 1978 it chose to
withdraw from the country. By contrast, Ford, which
controlled 40%, tried to improve its competitiveness
by introducing QCCs, which operated from 1980 to
1983. To this end, the company invested heavily in staff
training. The results were very encouraging while the
military dictatorship lasted, a period in which union
activity was banned and real wages deteriorated
considerably.
In late 1983, with the return of democracy and
union activity, workers concentrated on wage demands
and lost interest in QCCs; these were associated with a
7
 The concepts of internal and external flexibility come from Boyer
(1992).
8
 According to Sano (2001a), the fall in recruitment that took place
at the same time as “Japanization” was one of the causes of mass
unemployment in Argentina in the 1990s.
9
 This section and part of the next are based on interviews held in
July 1999, March 2000 and January 2003 at Ford (General Pacheco,
Buenos Aires), Volkswagen (General Pacheco, Buenos Aires),
Toyota (Zárate, Buenos Aires) and General Motors (Rosario), and
with the Sindicato de Mecánicos y Afines del Transporte Automotor
(SMATA), the car workers’ union.
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period in which their rights had been harshly repressed,
although in implementing them the management had
stressed worker participation in production
management. QCC activities went downhill. At the same
time, the external debt crisis led to the economy being
closed to external markets once again, with renewed
exchange controls and import regulations, so that the
management now had much less motivation to insist
on these circles being used.
Nonetheless, the period resulted in a lasting change
in Ford’s management style, which was no longer based
solely on supervision but was more open to dialogue
and entailed closer relations among workers,
supervisors and engineers. From 1987 to 1996, Ford in
Argentina was merged with Volkswagen in the
Autolatina company. Efforts were made during this
period to introduce management techniques from
Germany, including the formation of groups to resolve
specific problems and carry out activities similar to
those of kaizen.10
2. Job-linked pay as an obstacle
In 1996, after separating from Volkswagen, Ford began
a new effort to bring in Japanese production and
personnel management methods; as of 2000, the
implementation process was still going on.11 In 1991
the Government had introduced a neoliberal economic
policy based on a fixed exchange rate against the dollar,
trade and financial liberalization, mass privatization of
public-sector companies and labour reform (lower
redundancy payments, acceptance of short-term
employment, etc.). By contrast with the abortive
neoliberal effort that began in 1976, this time Argentina
actually did integrate into the globalizing system of
wealth production and distribution. Its industrial
structure changed rapidly. In these new circumstances,
General Motors returned to the country in 1993 and
Toyota set up its first Argentine plant, which began to
operate in March 1997, producing pickup trucks.
The time it has been taking Ford to implement its
new personnel management system can be put down to
the nature of the collective labour agreement governing
the employment relationship between the company and
its production staff. This agreement dates from 1989
(Autolatina-SMATA, 1989), but hardly differs from the
one signed in 1975. It stipulates that workers’ wages
are determined by the job they do and can only be
changed on the basis of length of service (an increase
of 1% a year) or a change of job within the company.
There are 10 wage categories directly related to specific
jobs. Within each category there are different wage
levels that depend on whether or not minor maintenance
tasks, self-monitoring for quality, etc. (partial elements
taken from the Japanese model) are performed.
About half of all production staff are in three
categories (5, 6 and 7), since any employee working
over 400 hours in a job with a higher wage category
than his or her normal one becomes entitled thenceforth
to receive the wage for that higher category. Not a single
worker remains in categories 1 and 2, and wage costs
per worker have risen so much over the years that they
are 60% higher than in companies such as General
Motors and Toyota. The two latter entered the country
(or returned to it, in the case of General Motors) in the
1990s; consequently, they have agreements signed then
which provide for flexible job allocation, i.e., internal
flexibility (General Motors de Argentina-SMATA, 1997;
Toyota Argentina-SMATA, 1996).
3. A new wage system on hold
The introduction of flexible manufacturing systems has
simplified the operations carried out by each worker;
many tasks have been programmed into numerically
controlled machine tools and computer-aided design
and manufacturing (CAD and CAM) systems, and
workers can more easily be switched among different
jobs. The Ford management argues that the old wage
system does not reflect this situation and wants to
replace it with a new one containing two to four basic
wage categories. If a two-category wage system were
opted for, one would be for production tasks and the
10
 In the words of Toyota (Toyota Argentina-SMATA, 1996, p. 12),
“Kaizen is a Japanese word that means improvement or the search
for a better way of doing things, making the company more efficient
and successful. It is a process of identifying and eliminating waste
or losses in machinery, materials or labour, or in production methods
or administrative procedures. This system sets out from the
‘standardized work principle’, which involves the company laying
down the procedures and standards that teams are to work to, and
team members working accordingly. Each team of employees can
review working procedures and standards continuously with a view
to improving efficiency, quality and working conditions so that,
once approval has been given, a new standard of work is
established” (translated from the Spanish).
11
 In Latin America, the Ford México factory in Hermosillo is in
the vanguard of “Japanization”. The manager of the Personnel
Department of Ford in Mexico was transferred from there to
Argentina. In an interview, he stated that productivity was then
higher at the Hermosillo factory than at the General Pacheco plant
in Argentina.
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other for maintenance. In turn, each category would
have two wage levels related to the actual functions
performed by workers, thereby retaining part of the old
system.
The company is not willing to keep workers’
current wage levels as a floor when changing the
system, since this would mean an increase in wage costs
that are already much higher than the company’s
competitors’. The union, for its part, is unwilling to
accept what would in practice be a wage cut for the
great majority of workers. Consequently, in early 1998
the company began negotiating with the union with a
view to applying the new wage system to all new
workers entering the company.
In early 1999, however, the macroeconomic
situation changed radically. The Brazilian currency was
devalued while in Argentina the fixed exchange rate
against the dollar was retained. Producing in the country
became steadily dearer in relative terms and its economy
went into a long recession. As a result, Ford laid off
1,900 workers that year, half of the total. Since there
was little prospect of further recruitment, negotiations
with the union were broken off.
The new wage system that the company wishes
to impose would be consistent with the new work
organization system it is implementing. Although the
prospects of adopting a new wage system are
virtually nil at present, the company is pressing ahead
with the adoption of the Japanese system of labour
organization. Workers are being grouped into teams
that can be allocated flexibly to different tasks, while
the command chain has been reduced to the following
ranks: team members, team leaders, instructors (one
for every three teams), superintendents (one per
sector: production, maintenance and logistics), area
managers (one per area: painting, stamping,
bodywork, etc.) and plant manager, the highest
authority in manufacturing.
As a result of this long and convoluted process of
change that began in 1980, there is now a much closer
relationship between production area management and
workers. Whereas in 1980 a worker had virtually no
opportunities to talk to an area manager, the latter now
goes to the shop floor daily. Even in 1990 the number
of levels in the command chain was much greater than
it is now. They were thinned out with a view to
reducing costs along Japanese lines. For production
and maintenance workers, however, the wage structure
has not changed. It is in this area that the company
has not yet been able to leave the Fordist tradition
behind it.
4. Union opposition to individual
assessment-based pay
The Sindicato de Mecánicos y Afines del Transporte
Automotor (SMATA), which represents car industry
workers, held out against the reduction of wage
categories at Ford for the reasons already noted.
However, it did accept that there could be less than four
wage categories at new General Motors and Toyota
plants (table 1). It was argued at the time that opposing
this would make these plants less likely to be established
on Argentine soil, thereby jeopardizing these new
sources of jobs. From the union point of view, then,
this was an exception. Even now the union has not
accepted the reduction of wage categories as inevitable.
This was made clear by the union leader at the Toyota
plant when he stated that his main objective in the
renewal negotiations for the 2000 collective labour
agreement was to increase the number of wage
categories to allow for greater wage variation, reflecting
the diversity of jobs.12
Although SMATA is still unwilling to see the number
of wage categories cut right back, it has welcomed the
introduction of a variable wage linked to the attainment
of productivity goals. Since this part of the wage is paid
to all workers alike, its introduction does not go against
the egalitarian working culture of the union. In both
General Motors and Toyota the variable portion is about
15% of the basic wage, although this percentage varies
depending on the extent to which productivity goals
are met. At General Motors, the variable wage rate in
relation to the basic wage changes every three months,
depending on the results achieved by the firm, and is
paid to all staff whether or not they are included in the
collective labour agreement. At Toyota the rate changes
monthly. Ford has refused to introduce a variable wage
since, as we have seen, doing so would put yet further
12
 In December 2000, Toyota renewed the collective labour
agreement to deal with the rising length of service among its staff
(Toyota Argentina-SMATA, 2002), so that the categories of operario
polivalente (now also called “team member”) and operario
polivalente líder de célula (“team leader”) were more narrowly
defined. In fact, there are six categories of operario polivalente or
team member (operario polivalente de ingreso, or entry-level team
member, and operario polivalente 1, 2, 3, 3A and 3B) and four
categories of operario polivalente líder de célula or team leader
(1, 2, 3 and 3A). At the same time, the criteria for moving up a
category were made more explicit, although after a year’s service
all entry-level team members automatically move up into the
category immediately above. The leaders of SMATA regard this
change as highly positive.
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upward pressure on wage costs that are already much
higher than its competitors’.
All three companies carry out assessments at both
the team and individual level, but these have no
immediate effect on wages. At Toyota there are “skills
maps” for each worker placed alongside the production
line for all to see. These charts, known as shigotohyou
(work tables) at the parent company in Japan, show the
extent to which each worker has developed the skills
necessary to carry out every one of a set of tasks, and
they are continuously updated as each person progresses
with the concrete application of these skills (table 2).
At Ford, workers are assessed by means of versatility
charts much like Toyota’s “maps”.13 At the individual
level, rewards in kind are generally given to workers
who have made the greatest number of suggestions
leading to improvements in the production process or
product quality.14 However, there is still a long way to
TABLE 1
Argentina: Wage scales at General Motors and Toyota
(Argentine pesos)
A. General Motors, 1997
Length of service Basic starting Basic wage after Basic wage after two
wage a year’s employment years’ employment
Function Multi- Multi-skilled Multi- Multi-skilled Multi- Multi-skilled
skilled worker skilled worker skilled worker
worker (team leader) worker (team leader) worker (team leader)
Multi-skilled worker (starting level) 522 574
Multi-skilled worker (full) 678 746 783 861 843 927
Specialized multi-skilled worker (starting level) 739 813
Specialized multi-skilled worker (full) 913 1 004 1 043 1 148 1 104 1 214
B. Toyota, 1996
Length of service Basic starting Basic wage after Basic wage after two Basic wage after three
wage a year’s employment years’ employment years’ employment
Function
Multi-skilled worker 520 630 650 670
Multi-skilled worker (team leader) 900 1 000 1 030 1 060
Source: General Motors de Argentina-SMATA (1997) and Toyota Argentina-SMATA (1996).
go before the union will accept individual wage
variations linked to workers’ performance.
General Motors and Toyota apply internal
flexibility in labour organization with a view to raising
efficiency and lowering costs, although changes in the
wage structure have been more modest in Argentine
subsidiaries than in the original Japanese model, owing
to the unwillingness of the union to agree to wage
differences based on individual performance. In any
event, the companies have taken the first steps in this
direction in the form of more minor incentives to
individual competition such as rewards in kind, early
payment of the length of service portion of wages in
recognition of rapid skill improvements, possible
promotion to team leader, and the displaying of
individual skill charts on the shop floor. In the view of
General Motors and Toyota, competition is still the only
route to efficiency.
13
 Versatility charts are used at Volkswagen too. In addition to
evaluating staff by means of these, Volkswagen applies an
“individual performance diagnosis for day-rate staff” whereby the
supervisor considers factors such as “responsibility”, “quality”,
“continuous improvement attitude”, “teamwork”, “tidiness and
cleanliness”, “safety attitude” and “punctuality and conduct”, with
the condition that “Personal characteristics and the friendliness or
otherwise of relations” with the worker “must not influence the
assessment” (Volkswagen, undated).
14
 At Toyota, the number of admissible proposals per worker initially
averaged barely three a year, but by 1998 the figure had increased
to 7.5. At the end of the year, after general consideration of the
proposals submitted, rewards are given to the three workers who
have most distinguished themselves in this respect. These rewards
include television sets, shopping vouchers and so on. In 1998, 25
“improvement (kaizen) circles” were operating. Some of these
circles take part in periodic meetings in Japan where they have the
opportunity to explain the results of their activities. In July 1999,
57 such circles were active.
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IV
Towards a new union strategy
In the previous section we referred to the micropolitical
economy of manager-worker relations during the
“Japanization” of the employment relationship. This
relationship is also affected, however, by different
aspects of the macropolitical economy. How can an
alternative strategy be put forward in the current
situation, given the incidence of macroeconomic
factors? The considerations that follow are an attempt
to cast light on the subject.
1. The macroeconomic context
From April 1991 (when a fixed exchange rate was
introduced with the passing of the convertibility act)
until early 2002, the Argentine State deprived itself of
the devaluation option. The authorities trusted that
neoliberal theory would work and thought that if the
peso became overvalued, trade liberalization and labour
market reform would ensure that prices and wages had
sufficient downward flexibility to make Argentina a
competitive country without the need to devalue. In a
context of unrestricted international capital movements,
however, and as a result of the Asian crisis that broke
out in 1997 and the devaluation of the Brazilian
currency in early 1999, the Argentine industrial sector
went into a deep crisis. The speed of the expected
downward adjustment in prices and wages did not match
the urgency of companies’ need to achieve
competitiveness, and in situations like this multinational
companies are quick to change their regional and global
strategies. Thus, as we have seen, Ford dismissed half
its workforce in 1999 and broke off negotiations over a
new collective labour agreement because there was so
little prospect of further recruitment.
Meanwhile, according to a report by the National
Institute of Statistics and Censuses (INDEC) on the
behaviour between 1993 and 1998 of the 500 largest
companies operating in the country, over those five
years the Argentine economy became increasingly
concentrated, saw assets fall rapidly into foreign hands
and experienced a worsening in the regressiveness of
income distribution; the average productivity of the 500
companies rose by 49.2%, while the average wage rose
by 19.6% (INDEC, 2000) and unemployment and the
TABLE 2
Stylized skills “map” and versatility charta
Surname, Position, operation, specialization or skill formation





Source: Prepared by the authors.
a
 For each position in which a worker operates there are four boxes representing four levels of skill formation in that position. As the
worker’s skill formation progresses, the boxes are shaded in black.
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informal sector expanded to levels unprecedented in
the country’s history. The 1999-2001 recession only
aggravated these tendencies.
2. Internal flexibility versus external flexibility
As we have seen, Japanese practices were introduced
into the employment relationship in a fragmentary way
over the 1990s. The internal flexibility in the use of
labour to which this process has given rise is a positive
development which generates productivity increases
indispensable for business competitiveness in the
macroeconomic context to which we have referred. At
the same time, it enriches or can enrich the working
lives of employees, insofar as these are trained to carry
out different jobs.15
For its part, external flexibility –i.e., the flexibility
to hire and fire– does away with the positive features of
the Japanese employment relationship for both company
and worker, namely the long-term employment
commitment of the firm and the worker’s commitment
to do his or her best to improve productivity and product
quality. If the latter commitment is not matched by the
former, the introduction of internal flexibility will be
seen by unions and workers as a way of cutting costs
and raising productivity at the expense of the workforce.
The introduction of some aspects of the Japanese
employment relationship in the Argentine automotive
industry, both in the early 1980s and in the 1990s, was
carried out in the framework of neoliberal economic
policies that promoted external flexibility. As a result,
unions and workers are not in a position to judge the
positive aspects of the Japanese management style in its
original form, and tend to confuse the problems deriving
from neoliberal economic policies with those deriving
from the “Japanization” of the employment relationship.
3. What is to be done?
It follows from the above that if the positive aspects of
the Japanese employment relationship are to be applied
fairly and efficiently in Argentina, it is essential for the
following two conditions to be met. Firstly, at the
macroeconomic level, the Government should lay the
groundwork for stable growth so that companies can
take a long-term view. Secondly, and in parallel with
this, the unions need to press companies for long-term
employment commitments. In other words, if the idea
is to introduce Japanese management methods in a
sound, honest way, a stand needs to be taken against
the current neoliberalism-driven globalization process.
There should be no return to an outworn populism, nor
should today’s neoliberalism be accepted. A “third way”
needs to be tried.16
Once these necessary conditions have been met, it is
also important to consider a factor that is vital for
improving the quality of people’s working lives. The
unions’ insistence on maintaining job-linked wage
categories is typical of the employment bureaucracy of
the Taylorist era and is not suited to a situation in which
job allocation will inevitably become more flexible. We
say “inevitably” because this process is one of the pillars
of the productivity growth that has been generated by the
new organization of labour and that, with proper income
distribution, could improve living standards for all.
Nonetheless, we want to raise some objections to
the insistence that internal flexibility needs to be
accompanied by the promotion of competitive relations
among workers. Firstly, “relationship network
externalities” operate in cooperative working situations,
so that in practice it is very difficult to separate out
accurately, using individual assessments, what each
worker has contributed to productivity and product
quality improvements. The actual results generated by
individual workers are influenced both by their
relationship with their workmates and by chance
circumstances. If this fact is ignored, those assessed
will be dissatisfied with the resultant wage differences
and will be less motivated to work hard at acquiring
knowledge that is specific to the company while they
are being trained there. The company will then be
unable to recover the costs it was put to in accumulating
knowledge internally. A more intelligent option is to
reap the “benefits deriving from cooperative work”
15
 However, the intensity of work and the diversity of the subjects
and responsibilities assigned to each worker are very great, and
create high levels of stress. It is worth noting that the annual staff
turnover rate is 3% a year at General Motors and 7% at Toyota,
although the difference may be at least partly due to the fact that
Toyota workers have a lower average age (21 as against 28 at
General Motors), making it less risky for them to brave the labour
market outside the company.
16
 The Government of the Alianza, with its “nuevo camino” (the
Argentine version of the “third way”), was in power from late 1999
until late 2001. It made some positive contributions, including the
promotion of a labour reform with some progressive elements, but
it did not confront the neoliberal economic institutions supported
by the Menem Government, such as the fixed exchange rate against
the dollar. This led to a very serious economic, social and political
crisis in late 2001, resulting in the fall of the Alianza Government.
The challenge in Argentina now is to find a new and genuine “third
way”.
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through long-term employment and length of service
pay as ways of safeguarding workers’ futures (Ohtaki,
1999).
There are other arguments, too. If we accept that
selfishness is not the only motive of human conduct, we
conclude that wages based on individual assessments,
whose source of legitimacy is selfishness, are based on a
narrow conception of the factors giving rise to this
conduct. According to Sen (1989, pp. 133-159), it is also
possible to create a propitious environment for successful
training involving multiple skills by way of mutual
“commitment” among work colleagues, i.e., through
cooperative relationships forged spontaneously among
workers. Again, the concept of “collective efficiency”
(Schmitz, 1999), developed in relation to the competitive
advantages of clusters of small and medium-sized
enterprises, has elements in common with the point of
view just expounded.
Further work is needed on these issues, and on
others such as: cooperation between unions and the
informal sector, bearing in mind that the latter has
grown to a size unprecedented in Argentine history;
the strengthening of international solidarity among
unions; and a critical survey of the Argentine socio-
economic system, taking the socio-economic system
of Japan as a reference.17 We shall return to this on
another occasion.
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